While the inclusion of South Africa (SA) into the bloc of emerging powers then known as the BRIC took many economists by surprise, it was hardly surprising from an international relations and political science perspective. Jim O’ Neil, who initially coined the term BRIC, stated in an interview with South Africa’s Mail & Guardian newspaper (23 March 2012) that “South Africa has too small an economy. There are not many similarities with the other four countries in terms of the numbers. In fact, South Africa’s inclusion has somewhat weakened the group’s power.”
Contrary to Jim O’ Neil’s statements, it is arguably the inclusion of South Africa into the group that both strengthened it and gave it the legitimacy it lacked before. Adhering to the principles of South-South Cooperation, the group had no claim to legitimacy without representation from the continent with the largest bloc of developing countries in the United Nations General Assembly. While South African diplomats and scholars have invoked the idea that South Africa brings the African Agenda to the table, it should be cautious to not overstate this point lest it had the opposite effect.
While few can argue with the fact that the post-apartheid South Africa has sought to play a constructive role in Africa as it pursues what Thabo Mbeki coined the “African Renaissance”, it should be careful to not intentionally or unintentionally project itself as the sole representative of a socially and politically diverse continent with over 1 billion people, 54 recognised nation states, and varying political interests.
In a recent article published by South Africa’s Business Day newspaper (November 4, 2013), Nigerian scholar Adekeye Adebajo cautions that “South Africa’s claim of exceptionalism does it a disservice”. These views cannot be taken lightly and South Africa’s foreign policy brains trust has to revisit the discourse that South Africa represents Africa’s interests in the international arena. This will only reinforce the idea in various African capitals of the exceptionalism referred to by Adebajo.
However, this should not prevent it from seeking and taking common positions on issues affecting the resurgent continent. Instead, taking common African or regional positions should be reserved for the appropriate structures such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), or world bodies such as the United Nations (UN). An example is South Africa’s peace-building efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where it has been working with regional and international partners and clearly has a broader mandate from the African Union and the United Nations. This could also include multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) where an Africa group has coalesced around similar interests.
While South Africa has certainly extended considerable amount of resources to Pan-African institutions such as the AU, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) , and been involved in peace negotiations in Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Burkina Faso, developments in the Central African Republic (CAR), where SA troops were attacked and forced to leave the country by rebel troops, revealed that Central African leaders were not pleased with the role played by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This was also the case when South Africa mediated in the civil conflict in Cote d’ Ivoire, where West African states saw themselves better positioned to lead the mediation.
The perception that South Africa “speaks for Africa” must thus be done away with. It merely reinforces the ideas of Cecil John Rhodes, who saw Africa north of the Limpopo as South Africa’s “natural hinterland”. It actually goes against the discourse of an “African Renaissance” and a “Rising Continent” able to stand on its own feet while unintentionally patronising increasingly confident nation states across Africa. Indeed, African nation states are quite capable of individually and collectively articulating their own interests and have consistently ranked among the top ten fastest growing economies over the past decade.
Against this backdrop, South Africa’s diplomacy must be unambiguous: like China, India, Brazil, and Russia, it primarily represents its own interests in global affairs although based on its geography, history and contemporary challenges it has a better understanding of the issues affecting the developing world. These aspects ensure that its interests are closer to those of its African peers, although not always identical. It must thus articulate an independent foreign policy rooted in its own values, history, and the welfare of its own people while ridding itself of the diplomatic myth that it somehow speaks for the entire continent. This is more likely to win the trust of sceptical nation states across the African continent.
(Philani Mthembu is a South African PhD Candidate at the Graduate School of Global Politics (GSGP) of the Freie Universitaet Berlin (FUB) and member of the Berlin Forum on Global Politics (BGoGP). His research is focused on on the rise of emerging powers as sources of development cooperation in Africa).
Author Profile
- India Writes Network (www.indiawrites.org) is an emerging think tank and a media-publishing company focused on international affairs & the India Story. Centre for Global India Insights is the research arm of India Writes Network. To subscribe to India and the World, write to editor@indiawrites.org. A venture of TGII Media Private Limited, a leading media, publishing and consultancy company, IWN has carved a niche for balanced and exhaustive reporting and analysis of international affairs. Eminent personalities, politicians, diplomats, authors, strategy gurus and news-makers have contributed to India Writes Network, as also “India and the World,” a magazine focused on global affairs.
Latest entries
DiplomacyDecember 14, 2024India, Iran and Armenia Advance Connectivity Push with Trilateral Talks in New Delhi- DiplomacyDecember 13, 2024Brazil’s G20 Presidency will focus on tangible results on UNSC reforms, climate action
- DiplomacyDecember 6, 2024India and Vietnam Strengthen Security Ties at 3rd Deputy Ministerial-Level Dialogue
- India and the WorldDecember 6, 2024India and UK Revitalize Strategic Ties at 2+2 Dialogue in New Delhi
