Deal Of The Century

Raja Mohan has established himself as a sound analyst of national security affairs. The quality that distinguishes him from other analysts is the clinical approach that he brings to bear on his analysis. He does not permit personal prejudices affect his examination of issues.

Raja Mohan’s “Impossible Allies” largely reflects this approach. The book makes an interesting reading of the negotiations between India and the United States that led to the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear cooperation deal in Washington on July 18, 2005. Indian readers in particular would find of great interest Raja Mohan’s narrative of the behind the scenes confabulations and the contribution made by the principal Indian negotiators such as former Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran. His enthusiasm for the Indo-US nuclear agreement comes through loud and clear. He allows himself to be carried away a little bit when he describes it as “the deal of the century”, considering that the century has just begun. He does, however, give ample space to all those in both countries, who find many things in it to be unhappy about.

Leaving aside objections on the American side, the main burden of criticism on the Indian side is that the deal would put a cap on India’s nuclear deterrent capability and that it would compromise India’s independent foreign policy. The principal advantage to India is that in addition to opening up access to latest civilian nuclear technology, the deal offers enormous opportunity for India to access high technology in all other sectors. The supporters of the deal point out that while the atomic energy establishment in the country has done highly commendable work in the face of stringent sanctions, it can do even better by benefiting from the latest technology that would become available, once the deal goes through. The official nuclear establishment in the country has assured the people that India’s nuclear capability will not be compromised in any way. However, even those analysts who support the deal are now getting worried that new and undesirable conditionalities might get attached to the deal by the time the US Congress is done with it.

The question that baffles this reviewer is why the United States should offer something which, according to Indian supporters and American critics, has more in it for India than for the Americans. American spokesmen, including President Bush, have described the deal as being in America’s interest since it would bring the two countries together in the promotion of democracy in the world, in combating terrorism and in contributing to reduction in environmental pollution. All these are laudable objectives but do not add up to a persuasive case for the deal from the American point of view. A hefty dose of skepticism is always in order in international relations.

Secretary of State Dr. Rice has spoken about several billion dollars worth of nuclear reactor contracts that would come America’s way. This rationale makes sense, but is still not enough to provide adequate explanation of American motives. The one factor, namely, balancing and containment of China is not mentioned by anyone on either side, but is the only one weighty enough from American perspective. The current American policy is one of engaging China, but super powers have to hedge their bets and think in long term. But if China is the motivating factor, USA might be in for disappointment since India will not play the American game vis-a-vis China.

Much is made of the new ‘strategic’ relationship between India and the United States. ‘Strategic’ means the relationship would be strong enough to survive temporary setbacks such as, for example, Germany’s strong disapproval of American intervention in Iraq. One wonders how Indo-US ‘strategic’ relationship would be affected if India were to vote contrary to American wishes on Iran. To the credit of the drafters of the July 18 agreement, the word ‘strategic’ is not used even once in it.

Why should United States want to help India become a major power? The supporters of the deal remind us that after the end of the Second World War, America helped the former enemy states, Germany and Japan, not only recover but develop into strong nations. What is so strange, it is argued, if the Americans now want to help India, a fellow and friendly democratic country in a similar fashion? The answer lies in the fact that Germany and Japan have become staunch allies of the United States. Japan is unable, for its own reasons, to follow a foreign policy independent of United States’ interests. With one brief interregnum, at the time of US intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003, Germany has been and continues to be a loyal supporter of American policies and interests. Indian people as well as political parties are greatly attached to the concept of independent foreign policy. Pressure exercised by the United States, particularly the Congress, on India to support American position on Iran is resented almost across the board. Of particular worry is the distinct possibility that the Americans would hold the nuclear deal hostage to the positions that India might take on issues of vital concern for the United States. Already American senators are objecting to India’s joining in nonaligned consensus. If the deal is going to be subjected to annual certification by the American President, as is demanded by some in the US Congress, India’s foreign policy stand would definitely enter American calculations at the time for each such certification.

Raja Mohan’s book was rushed into publication to coincide with President Bush’s visit to India in early March 2006. This has led to an embarrassingly large number of editing errors. A little more unexplainable lapse is the assertion on page 17 that Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 11, 1998 was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter; it was not.

All in all, “Impossible Allies” is a useful contribution to the debate on Indo-US relations in general and Indo-US nuclear deal in particular. We should look forward to his next book on the subject as and when the deal is ratified by both sides and starts showing results which, hopefully, will be all positive from India’s perspective.