The US and China in Southeast Asia: A Volatile Backyard?

obama-aseanAmid the partial government shutdown, US President Barack Obama may have cancelled his plans to attend ASEAN and East Asia summits this week, but this should in no way reflect a downgrading of the US’ interests in this crucial region. There is a lot riding on US ‘pivot’ – now more commonly called ‘rebalancing’ – to East and Southeast Asia. The Obama administration remains committed to its signature foreign policy move, which, not unnaturally, has grabbed headlines across the world in the last couple of years, and especially in the region in question. It’s also time to reflect what the US rebalancing means for the region; two years down the line, there is a widespread feeling that the move has only made the region far more volatile.

China’s political rise, its economic clout and its recent spate of assertive maritime posturing has added a rather fluid element to the mix, besides adding a new context for the ‘pivot’. China’s economic rise, for example, has not only won the admiration of Southeast Asian countries, but has helped Beijing crystallise strong economic ties with nearly all of them. However, regardless of how well China conducts its economic diplomacy vis-a-vis Southeast Asia, the same cannot be said about its foreign policy with regard to the region.  With Southeast Asia rapidly becoming a theatre for the to-and-fro posturing of these two regional powers, small wonder that certain trends on issues of geopolitical security are becoming more and more evident.

Southeast Asia Rising

Ikerry-brunei1t is common knowledge that in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Southeast Asia became the engine for regional integration in East Asia. With the evolution of the ASEAN plus three (APT) mechanism, and various regional spin-offs all centred around ASEAN, Southeast Asia harbours several fast growing economies as well as markets numbering nearly 500 million people. Apart from its economic importance, its geostrategic location ensures that it occupies a vital position in today’s international relations.  Southeast Asia lies at the intersection of two of the globe’s most heavily travelled sea-lanes. The east-west route connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans while the north-south route links Australia and New Zealand to Northeast Asia. Both routes are, needless to say, economic lifelines for oil and natural resource import and export. Additionally, nearly all shipping from the Middle East to the Pacific goes through the three Straits (“chokepoints”) in the region: the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and the Straits of Lombok and Makassar. Given the interests of regional powers like China and Pacific powers like the United States in the region, Southeast Asia is rapidly becoming a theatre in which the interests of these two countries are coming into conflict in certain areas and cooperating in others. The South China Sea dispute has only served to throw the region even more into the global limelight.

Game of Thrones


With the rise of Southeast Asia as an important entity in the international order and balance of power politics making the geopolitical landscape a somewhat fluid one, especially with ongoing maritime sovereignty disputes, regional voices are making themselves heard. The Philippines and Vietnam, for instance, have never hidden their alliance with the United States. They are, perhaps, the only Southeast Asian countries, which are not playing the strategic game, but are directly hedging their bets against the rise of China. Both countries are courting great power support in their stances in the geopolitical cauldron that is contemporary Southeast Asia. The Philippines, indeed, has announced that it will soon enter into negotiations with Washington in order to increase troop influx into the country. This is a move that is seen to be a direct counter for the rise of China, with which Manila has had its fair share of quarrels and skirmishes over the past year.
Malaysia and Cambodia, on the other hand, tilt towards the Chinese umbrella of protection, as was evidenced by Cambodia’s moves during its time as chair of the ASEAN Summit last year. For Malaysia’s part, it declared recently that it does not share the concerns of other Southeast Asian claimants to the South China Sea, despite the fact it is itself a claimant to the region. Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein went on record at the sidelines of meetings with counterparts from ASEAN as well as the US, China and Japan, saying “Just because you have enemies doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies.” He expanded on the statement saying that that the Chinese “can patrol every day, but if their intention is not to go to war then it is of less concern.”
Most other countries, such as Singapore and Indonesia prefer to harp on strategic autonomy, while balancing the two powers themselves. Indeed, no country wants a conflict or a potential Cold War situation to develop, but it can safely be said that no country wishes either China or the US to dominate. This year’s Shangri-La Dialogue clearly illuminates the fact that strategic trust and strategic autonomy are central to the region at the moment. While Southeast Asian countries are aware of their geographical reality, they are not averse to walking a strategic tightrope between the US and China. A clear example is that of Malaysia, which, despite being quite vocal about its support for China, has accepted American interests as well, as Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel visited the country recently to reaffirm the depth and closeness of US-Malaysia ties.

The Eagle and the Dragon
Bilaterally speaking, it is unlikely that tensions and frictions may develop between countries due to their separate relationships with the two major powers. The clear trend in the region is that while China is a guarantor of economic prosperity, the United States is the shoulder to lean on for security purposes.

China is the largest trading partner for most Southeast Asian countries, and has strong economic ties with ASEAN as a multilateral institution as well. The United States, on the other hand, is relatively far behind in terms of economic figures in comparison to China. But where it lacks in terms of economic incentive, the United States has certainly proven itself to be a big brother in terms of security support.

From Malaysia to Indonesia, the United States has worked to deepen security and defence cooperation ties, and has more than once declared itself to be the shoulder that various Southeast Asian countries can lean on in times of crisis. This being said, Southeast Asian countries are aware of the big power politics being played out in the region. The only area where impasses on the issue have been observed is the ASEAN  regional forum and its spin-offs. Last year’s summit at Phnom Penh and China’s manipulation of Cambodia (the then chair of ASEAN) in order to make its own interests in the South China Sea paramount is a good case in point. Despite this, Southeast Asia continues to uphold ASEAN as the only viable means forward when it comes to conflict resolution or great power politics.

 

Author Profile

India Writes Network
India Writes Network
India Writes Network (www.indiawrites.org) is an emerging think tank and a media-publishing company focused on international affairs & the India Story. Centre for Global India Insights is the research arm of India Writes Network. To subscribe to India and the World, write to editor@indiawrites.org. A venture of TGII Media Private Limited, a leading media, publishing and consultancy company, IWN has carved a niche for balanced and exhaustive reporting and analysis of international affairs. Eminent personalities, politicians, diplomats, authors, strategy gurus and news-makers have contributed to India Writes Network, as also “India and the World,” a magazine focused on global affairs.